Introduction
Are Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) making a difference? This theme issue of Development Policy Review explores that question, drawing on the early evidence from seven countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The contributions derive from a multicountry study of PRSP processes in Africa commmissioned by the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA), the joint forum of multilateral and bilateral development agencies on assistance to low-income Africa. Eight country studies and a synthesis report were presented to the SPA Plenary session in January 2002 and fed into the first review of the PRSP approach by the World Bank and IMF in the first quarter of 2002. Further work was done to update the findings during 2002 (IMF and IDA, 2002a, b) .
Background
PRSPs were introduced in late 1999 as a device to help ensure the proper use of debt relief under the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries facility (HIPC2). Preparation by the national government of an Interim PRSP (iPRSP) was set as one of the conditions for reaching Decision Point, and substantial effective relief, under the HIPC2 scheme. A full PRSP, prepared in consultation with other national stakeholders, became, along with other 'triggers', a condition for HIPC2 Completion. However, PRSP processes have since assumed wider significance, both for poor countries and for international development co-operation.
First, PRSP documents have taken the place of the former Policy Framework Papers as the required statement of recipient government objectives for the purposes of adjustment lending by the IMF and concessional credits from the World Bank. Increasingly, bilateral development agencies have taken their lead from this and, in one sense or another, reorganised their own country programmes with reference to national policies set out in PRSPs. Second, both the large international financial institutions (IFIs) have introduced new lending instruments avowedly designed to support the implementation of PRSPs -a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (IMF) and a Poverty Reduction Support Credit (World Bank/IDA). These are not merely formal changes, or new labels for established activities. They reflect long-term shifts in the policy thinking of the IFIs, and the senior management of both the Fund and the Bank mean them to signal fundamental changes in the way those organisations do business.
The PRSP initiative has already stimulated much debate, some controversy and a considerable informal literature in the form of website material, reports and working papers. This journal issue, to be followed shortly by a longer report in book form published by the Overseas Development Institute for the SPA, represents the most substantial formal publication on the subject to date. It attempts to provide an interim report on PRSP experience in Africa that is both hopeful and realistic.
The contributors do not adopt a single view, partly because the countries they have studied are different and partly, no doubt, for reasons of temperament, discipline or affiliation. But, compared with the radical sceptics who lie at one end of the continuum of opinion about the PRSP initiative, this collection could be regarded as constructively critical. Compared with the other end of the spectrum, its authors take very seriously the structural obstacles to genuine, non-cosmetic improvements in the domestic policies of African countries and the way these interact with aid.
We start from the belief that the PRSP initiative represents, at least potentially, a non-trivial change in the way international support to poverty reduction in developing countries is framed and delivered. We believe that it provides an opportunity to address some critical problems in both the governance of poor countries and the institutional framework of development assistance. In particular, it could be the solution to the chronic tendency of much aid for poverty reduction to undermine the conditions of its own success, by weakening the capacities of governments and other national institutions to act for themselves.
It is by no means a foregone conclusion that it will work in this way. On the contrary, the aid business will surely require more than greater understanding and better intentions at the top to really transform it in the required ways. And rather more important, examples of successful engineering of national social and political change on the scale anticipated by the more radical versions of the PRSP vision are rather rare in history. For this reason, we have made an effort, in approaching the African PRSP experience to date, to temper hope with realism, avoiding both cynicism and naivety.
Scope of the work
The SPA study was focused on PRSP processes. It set out to investigate the extent to which poverty reduction policies, programmes, practices and monitoring systems were being institutionalised in selected African countries. It was intended to provide some early feedback on the degree to which the new elements introduced into IFI conditionality by the Enhanced HIPC framework were leading to poverty reduction plans that benefit from greater country ownership and, therefore, promise to be more effective.
Attention was focused on three main topics:
• the attitudes, commitments and plans of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, including multilateral and bilateral donor agencies; • the institutional changes that were being introduced, especially in respect of:
(a) public financial management and (b) participation in policy-making and other aspects of the governance framework; and • the development of PRSP monitoring and information systems.
It is worth underlining that the research undertaken did not involve a systematic assessment of PRSP documentation or any other aspect of the content of the strategies being developed by countries. The principal focus was on processes and institutions. This seemed justified on the grounds that a substantial improvement in how governments define and manage reduction policies is the main precondition for improving what they actually deliver in terms of actions and results.
The research was initially based on case studies of the experience of seven countries: Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda and Tanzania. Mozambique was added at an early stage, taking advantage of a study commissioned separately by the Swedish International Development Agency and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ghana was the subject of a case study, but the PRSP process in Ghana changed gear so radically after the main research was done (because of the election victory of President Kufuor's New Patriotic Party) that a mere updating of the findings for the purposes of this publication was considered impractical.
1 Results from just seven case studies are therefore being published.
The topics outlined above were investigated in three phases, over a two-year period. Phase 1 (September 2000 -January 2001 was an initial scoping exercise, designed to identify key issues for further investigation and provide a baseline against which to gauge later developments. This was based on in-country interviews and documentary work of about two weeks' duration. Phase 2 (February-October 2001) involved more extended research in the study countries, with somewhat widened terms of reference and a larger effort of analysis and synthesis. Phase 3 consisted of report dissemination in several countries, and a systematic updating of information across the whole set.
All of the study countries were in principle eligible for Enhanced HIPC relief, apart from Kenya, where concessional loans were not available for much of the past decade, and a major accumulation of domestic debt took place instead.
2 Most countries in our sample submitted their Interim PRSPs, satisfying the main conditions for the HIPC2 Decision Point, during the middle months of 2000. Tanzania was permitted to proceed quickly to complete and submit a full PRSP in 2000, although HIPC2 Completion awaited the PRSP's first annual review. The other countries moved at different speeds towards presentation of their PRSPs during 2001 and In most cases, our research began during the culmination of the iPRSP phase, while the main research in-country coincided with a fairly advanced stage in the consultations and other work on the full PRSP. The country study teams each conducted between 25 and 50 interviews in each stage of the research. Interviewees were treated both as 'key informants' and as stakeholders whose opinions on different subjects were of substantive interest to the study. Some care was taken with the conduct of the interviews and their interpretation. In all cases, the picture that emerged came from the combined and cross-checked testimony of the different actors, not from the views of individuals on their own.
Phase 1 interviewees included senior government officials with responsibility for the PRSP process or poverty monitoring; officials of other echelons of government (for example, line Ministries); parliamentarians, including members of opposition parties; private business representatives; heads of civil society membership organisations; leaders of national or international NGOs; independent consultants and academics; technical assistance personnel; and embassy, donor-agency and IFI staff. In all cases, interviews were conducted with individuals in several different categories.
In Phase 2 of the study, informants were re-interviewed and attempts were also made to widen the range of stakeholders consulted, with greater efforts to include those living outside the national capital and formal 'development' spheres. Coverage of donor perceptions and intentions was also increased.
Arriving at an overview
An obvious difficulty facing the synthesis of findings in an exercise such as this is that the different countries are indeed different, and much of the interest is embedded in the detail. In our reports for the SPA, we attempted to handle this by entering key information and 'pointers' from the country studies in analytical matrices. The main text then provided an overview of the analysis in the country reports, discussing the issues that emerged for at least significant sub-groups of countries. This article retains the substance of that approach.
The remainder of the article is organised into six sections. The next section clarifies further what we think is the challenge of PRSPs, and includes a review of how the initiative originated, plus an overview of the main features of the context at the country level. The following five sections explain what emerge as the major findings and practical implications, particularly but not exclusively for donor agencies, of the country studies. The concluding section returns to what we take as the principal 'hypothesis' underlying the PRSP initiative -the major factor that will affect whether, in the long term, it makes a difference to poverty reduction efforts in Africa or not.
2. In 2000, Ghana had opted not to seek HIPC2 relief but then, under the NPP government, changed its position, with significant implications for the place of the PRSP in national policy.
Asking the right questions
The PRSP initiative may prove ephemeral, a passing fashion in the ever-changing world of international development. There is also a distinct possibility that PRSPs will make a real difference -that they will have a greater impact on development practice and outcomes than the debt relief with which they were initially associated. HIPC2 may very well pass into history mainly as the occasion when PRSPs were born. These are strong claims. Understanding how they can be made calls for clarity about the situation out of which the PRSP initiative arose, and the kind of challenge it represents. Contrary to some superficial appreciations of the initiative, it does not arise from a naïve assessment of the past and present obstacles to effective poverty reduction in aid-dependent countries. Nor does it imply a renewal of faith in the simple efficacy of 'strategic' thinking, as reflected in official policy documents.
The nature of the issue
The phrase Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper has a literal meaning and an aura of solemnity that are potentially deceptive. Some of the language in which PRSPs are discussed is strongly reminiscent of the early days of 'development planning', in the 1950s and 1960s, when the world seemed a simpler place than it does now. The concept of a PRSP might seem to imply that the reduction of poverty is more straightforwardly amenable to rational thinking and action than we know to be the case. Is there not an element of naïvety in the concept, one that could sow the seeds of later disillusionment?
There certainly is some basis for this concern. But the possibility raised by PRSPs is not whether the world has changed in some fundamental way, so that the obstacles to a simple-minded 'rational planning' approach have suddenly disappeared.
On the contrary, the PRSP challenge arises from the observation that the world remains very much as it was. It stems from the almost unreserved failure of all previous instruments and processes to achieve significant breakthroughs in the field of poverty reduction in the poorest countries, especially in Africa. It raises the possibility that, against this background of failure, small adjustments in ways of doing certain things might make a significant difference.
The adjustments in question are not so much about 'planning' as about appreciating processes of structural change, particularly within the domestic societies and governance institutions of poor countries, and their decisive influence on the outcomes of development efforts. It is by no means suggested that the need to make concessional funding and debt relief conditional upon changes in policies and institutions within recipient countries has disappeared. What is claimed is that a shift in the emphasis of conditionality, focusing more on policy processes oriented to particular sorts of outcomes, and less on specific preconditions, just might make a crucial difference.
The origins of the PRSP proposals reflect some combination of:
• disappointing poverty reduction performance in most highly indebted and aiddependent countries throughout the last 20 years, despite substantial changes in policies and institutions; • growing recognition of the importance of the national policy context for aid effectiveness;
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• increased awareness of the limitations of conventional conditionalities for levering some of the critical changes; • a search for new instruments with which to justify a major new debt-reduction initiative.
The PRSP principles extend and largely incorporate the ideas previously developed around the World Bank's proposals for a Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) governing development co-operation in borrowing countries. The following are key elements in this thinking.
5
• Policy-making for poverty reduction should take the form of a country-led strategy process, in which government engages in dialogue with other constituents of the national society, resulting in greater national ownership of the decisions taken.
• It should be results-or outcome-oriented, starting from an analysis of poverty and its causes and working backwards to the design of appropriate policies.
• The thinking should be comprehensive in its coverage of different macro, sectoral and cross-sectoral issues that affect poverty reduction processes and prospects.
• The basis for international support should be a form of partnership, in which all funding sources are drawn together in a co-ordinated way around a strategy developed under the leadership of the recipient government.
• This is visualised as a medium-to long-term process, implying a need for medium-term commitments as well as careful consideration of appropriate timing, performance criteria and monitoring arrangements.
Process conditionality?
Behind the PRSP initiative, there is a belief that 'process conditionality' (Foster et al., 1999) may succeed where previous forms of conditionality, focused on specific policy measures, have failed. A central hypothesis is that refocusing IFI approaches, in the context of HIPC2 and the new lending instruments, will enable the adoption of poverty reduction policies and programmes that benefit from greater national ownership and commitment than has been the case in the past. This in turn will lead to greater effectiveness and sustainability of anti-poverty action. Any study of PRSP experience needs to concern itself with whether this hypothesis seems likely to prove true. This does not mean that we are reaching the stage where a 4. The particular form of this argument advanced in Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998) , using econometric results to suggest extremely low aid effectiveness in unfavourable policy environments, is contested (e.g., Tarp, 2000) . However, in a more generic form the proposition is increasingly accepted. 5. This draws on World Bank (2000) and IDA (1999, 2000) . rigorous test is possible -far from it. However, we do think it is reasonable to start asking several related questions: whether there has yet been a sufficiently clear shift towards a new form of conditionality; in what respects national ownership of poverty reduction efforts has been enhanced so far; what else could usefully be done to strengthen any benign, and weaken any corrupting, effects; and whether, on current evidence, the hypothesis remains plausible and/or needs to be refined.
Politics matters
Underlying the research reported in this collection is a common belief that poverty reduction policy is, for better or worse, embedded in living political systems. This implies that the PRSP experiment will work through the political systems and policy processes of the countries concerned, or it will not work at all. PRSPs will either engender new relationships and dynamic processes within countries that result in poverty policies being handled in a new and more effective way, or they will not. What happens in this respect will be a highly political issue, in two senses. First, for all their limitations, formal political systems are a powerful influence on what happens in every country. Second and probably more important, the informal arrangements and understandings that determine policy and its implementation are also 'political', not merely technical.
It follows from this that an important part of the study has been to establish a realistic framework of understanding of the political background, its constraints and possibilities, in each of the country cases. All the other articles in the collection include a brief consideration of these issues. Here, we attempt a similarly concise overview.
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From a social and political perspective, the country contexts we are concerned with contain some significant contrasts. From the point of view of a study of the institutionalisation of poverty reduction strategies, the commonalities are also important.
Patronage-based states
An initial generalisation is that in all cases we are dealing with semi-democratised states in which domestic politics tends to be patronage-based, with fragmented party systems and weak civil societies. We may also say that all have quite fragmented policy processes. That is, they are characterised by poor co-ordination both between different centres of decision-making, and between the formulation and implementation of policies. In addition, these countries share high levels of financial and institutional aid dependency. This produces low accountability to domestic actors, and contributes also to the persistence of clientelism and policy fragmentation. At a more technical level, public expenditure and revenue management systems have, at least until recently, been only weakly driven by public policy objectives. Administrative systems have similarly been characterised by low morale and weak performance incentives.
These features are among the problems that the PRSP initiative is intended to address. At the same time, they affect the range of outcomes that can reasonably be expected from PRSP processes. In a sense, the central issue we are addressing is 6. A fuller account is included in the forthcoming SPA/ODI book.
whether PRSP-related changes can get enough of a foothold before being overcome by the very structures and processes they aim to transform. As will become apparent, different country experiences to date suggest different answers to this fundamental question.
It is not part of the business of this study to contribute to the portrayal of Africa as a region where 'nothings works' and there is only conflict, backwardness and decay. We use such concepts as neo-patrimonialism and clientelism (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; van de Walle, 2001 ) as standard social science terms that are not only applied to poor developing countries. We do not see them as wedded to a particular evolutionary scheme of progress. Their point is to help us to be realistic about what is specific to the countries we are dealing with. To borrow the title and the theme of the book by Chabal and Daloz (1999) , 'Africa works': African polities and societies may not provide very well for their people, but understanding why that is the case entails understanding their own particular principles of operation, including their moral underpinnings; 7 it is not assisted by an approach that only emphasises the way such societies fall short of supposed international norms.
Not only is the way Africa works not just a catalogue of failure, but the structures and processes responsible for undergirding the whole affair are by no means just African. As the country articles argue, the clientelism and 'rent-seeking' that typifies the real policy process in all of the study countries to a greater or lesser degree is both cause and consequence of an aid relationship that serves its nominal purposes very poorly. Apart from being heavily indebted, the countries are highly dependent on aid, both financially and, more important, in institutional terms. Institutional aid dependency is understood here as including a loss of capacity to make and implement planning decisions arising from the gross imbalance between domestically generated revenues and the actual or potential availability of external finance.
The aid relationship and the critique of projects
It seems likely that high aid volumes, whatever the form of aid delivery, foster institutional aid dependency. Some research -focused on the ability of states to translate a given level of GNP per capita into improvements in human developmentsuggests that states which rely heavily on aid are less effective than those that draw substantially on other income sources, such as general tax revenues (Moore, 1998; Moore et al., 1999) .
All aid may have the effect of weakening accountability to domestic actors, which in turn may reduce effectiveness in poverty reduction. However, there are also grounds for concern about specific modalities of aid delivery. The loss of public planning and implementation capacity that we have identified as the core of institutional aid dependency is believed by many to arise particularly from the dominance in the aid relationship of the project modality. The case for sector support and other forms of 7. Ekeh (1975) made the classic case that the moral principles governing the 'public' and the private spheres in Africa are comprehensively different from, rather than inferior to, those that developed historically in Europe. Gould (1997) explains well how understanding African societies involves steering a course between sentimental traditionalism and performance standards imported mechanically from other realities.
programme aid or budget support has been built up on the basis of concerns about the project modality in particular. The dominance acquired by the project modality of development assistance in recent decades is a response to a deep-seated imperative. Donors have resorted to building parallel management structures and separate accounting arrangements for their aid as a means of avoiding the inefficiency and unreliability of mainstream government procedures. The reasons for the continued popularity of projects are not entirely unsound. However, there is increasingly wide recognition that they contribute in a vicious circle to the persistence of the difficulties to which they are a response. Projectised donor funds divert skills and attention away from mainstream processes of development management in a country, and undermine incentives for officials to spend time on reform and strategic thinking at the centre.
The damage is recognised to be worse if project design is supply-driven; that is, motivated by donor incentives to disburse grant or loan funds for particular purposes, and/or if the aid is tied. However, these may be more usefully regarded as exacerbating factors rather than the principal problem. In a project framework, under conditions where projects are the dominant form of aid, real 'national ownership' of poverty reduction efforts is most unlikely to be achieved. Effectiveness in meeting goals is likely to be reduced as a result.
Project aid has indirect effects on state capacity, as well as direct ones, and the indirect effects may be the more important. We have said that domestic political patterns cannot be considered separately from the nature of the aid relationship. The modal type of patronage-based political system referred to earlier might well exist in the absence of aid. Policy processes might still be fragmented (as indeed they are in many parts of the world). On the other hand, it is clear that the social and economic relationships of project aid fit very easily into a system of patron-client relationships and can help to fuel it and strengthen its institutional foundations.
Previous poverty policies
A final element of general context needs to be noted. In none of the eight countries except Rwanda is the PRSP process the first experience in developing a national poverty reduction strategy. Some initial efforts, particularly in the form of improvements in the availability of basic data on poverty conditions, were already undertaken in response to the Social Dimensions of Adjustment initiative in the early 1990s. A more substantial and sustained effort followed the Copenhagen Social Summit (1995) and was reinforced by the sequence of international agreements on poverty reduction goals that culminated in the UN's Millennium Summit.
Among the international agencies, UNDP in particular committed itself strongly to facilitating and providing technical support for national poverty strategies, and encouraging international learning from these experiences (UNDP, 2000; Grinspun, 2001) . From our country studies and other sources, it is clear that these efforts did help in various ways to place poverty more squarely on public agendas and promote attempts to tackle it in a more deliberate way.
This forms an important part of the context for PRSPs. However, it would be a serious mistake to see PRSPs as just more of the same. In several important respects, previous poverty reduction programmes and strategies in the study countries took a form that differs systematically from the PRSP approach as we understand it.
8 First, poverty reduction was typically handled as a special activity, added on to existing programmes and thus requiring special structures and activities. Second, the emphasis was on providing a new focus for project funding, not on influencing the processes of public resource allocation through the national exchequer. Third, where the national poverty reduction efforts did include strategic policy statements, these showed a tendency to be vague statements of aspirations. They were not based on a thorough assessment of previous policies and approaches. In asking the question 'Have PRSPs made a difference?', we are in part placing the spotlight on these specific weaknesses of previous international efforts to kick-start vigorous anti-poverty action in the study countries.
These, then, are the elements of the PRSP question, as we see it. Can policyprocess conditionality succeed where other forms of conditionality have failed? Will PRSP processes begin to effect changes before being overcome by the patterns of behaviour they are intended to transform? And have international aid policies changed enough in response to the challenge of PRSPs? The following five sections outline what seem to be the answers, based on the three years or so of experience in the study countries. The section titles convey five major conclusions, whose thrust is to suggest that in some quite important ways PRSPs have made a difference for the better. In each section, however, some vital provisos are added, and recommendations are made about the need for greater or different efforts on the part of the major actors. The major conclusions are:
• PRSPs have mainstreamed and broadened national poverty reduction efforts.
• Complementary reforms are essential, especially in the area of public sector governance.
• New spaces for domestic policy dialogue have been created.
• Monitoring processes may improve the quality of poverty reduction strategies.
• PRSPs invite a more substantial transformation of the aid relationship.
PRSPs have mainstreamed and broadened national poverty reduction efforts
According to the case studies, acceptance of the PRSP approach by African governments was swift. This was partly, perhaps overwhelmingly, because of the powerful incentive created by the prospect of HIPC2 debt relief -although Kenya moved vigorously to institute a PRSP formulation process without that incentive. In all cases, a range of national stakeholders responded positively. Although PRSPs were understood to be the result of additional conditionality, albeit of a new type, the new approach was not strongly opposed anywhere. Initial frictions arising from the particular policy backgrounds in some countries (for example, Mali) were mostly overcome between 2000 and 2001. This is perhaps unsurprising, and banal as a finding. It has never been the case that highly aid-dependent African countries have not acceded to the formalities of a new 8. Unfortunately, while the UNDP evaluation study on this previous phase (Grinspun, 2001 ) provides much relevant information, it does not highlight these differences.
way of working that has been strongly advocated by the IFIs, with the backing of major bilateral donors. However, our study suggests that PRSPs have already made a difference in some ways that go beyond formalities and are not banal. Three important shifts are documented in the country studies:
• At an early stage, responsibility for co-ordinating countries' principal policy instruments for dealing with poverty shifted to Ministries of Finance. This reflected the fact that PRSPs were being requested by the IFIs, whose natural interlocutors are Ministries of Finance. Though not entirely unproblematic, and not always popular, this shift has tended to imply an upgrading of poverty policy, with further positive implications.
• As a result of the PRSP initiative, there has been, across all of the countries to a greater or lesser degree, a move away from the traditional approach of focusing poverty reduction efforts on the social sectors. Poverty reduction is increasingly seen as a goal of all sectors and cross-cutting policy areas, including those governing 'productive' activities such as agriculture. This change is important and was long overdue.
• A more favourable institutional context has also been created for linking poverty reduction to discussions about budget priorities and the medium-term allocation of national and donor resources. This is important since, as pointed out above, previous national poverty reduction strategies tended to be both institutionally marginalised and unrelated to the national budget, and heavily oriented towards attracting new donor projects.
Limits to impact
These shifts are significant and probably irreversible gains, affecting some aspects of the way governments work. On the other hand, the country experiences caution us against expecting too much too quickly from this relative 'mainstreaming' of antipoverty efforts. Many of the corresponding gains in terms of performance and results remain potential rather than actual. Decisive further steps will be necessary to realise the potential. The principal missing link is the difficult and to some degree technical one discussed in the next section. Others are obvious and non-controversial, and we deal with them first. Even today, after countries' full PRSPs have in most cases been agreed by cabinets and endorsed by the Joint Boards of the Bank and the Fund, the impact on public consciousness -even at the level of opinion leaders -remains shallow. Awareness of the existence of a PRSP (as distinct from the myriad of donor-supported projects and programmes) still tends to be limited to a few layers of officialdom in central government and to a limited range of non-governmental actors. Clear understanding of the distinctive features of the approach, and the degree to which it does and does not constitute a break with the past, is especially scarce. Full PRSPs have had a much larger impact on public consciousness than the Interim documents did. But there are big variations between countries in the degree to which even the full PRSP has made an impression, as recorded in the country articles.
A first policy message emerging from the study was, therefore, that further efforts, are needed to spread understanding of PRSP principles within countries as well as between them. For the PRSP approach to work on the scale that is expected, it needs to be widely disseminated and understood across central and local government as well as within the research/advocacy community working outside of government. This was the case in 2000, and it remains the case at the beginning of 2003. There has been useful learning in many countries on how to involve different actors in the drafting and consultation processes connected with PRSPs. However, this needs to be generalised to other dimensions of the PRSP process, and shared with countries where the tendency to create 'enclaves of understanding' has been more marked.
Disseminating information is a first step; translating the PRSP document into local languages is another; and both of these things have been done in a few countries. But sharing information is not the same as creating understanding. The latter will require a more systematic approach that engages relevant stakeholders in a continuous process of learning about the PRSP and its relationship to other policy and aid processes. The range of relevant stakeholders should not be narrowly defined, and certainly not limited to the technical levels of government.
In regard to inter-country sharing, the work of the World Bank Institute and the UN Economic Commission for Africa in hosting learning events has been very valuable. This could be usefully emulated at country level, providing a more consistent, joined-up approach to deepening understanding about the PRSP (i.e. linking it to other reform initiatives such as local government reform, sector reform, anti-corruption measures and the media). Resident IFI staff should be encouraged to play an active role in such events, and not regard them as falling outside their sphere of responsibility.
How to promote the PRSP concept in-country
A further point is about the content of the dissemination of PRSPs in-country. According to our research, there is too little appreciation in most countries that the PRSP exercise has the potential to be much more than a new means of accessing external funds. The idea that a good PRSP could be the instrument for liberating countries from burdensome conditionalities and unwelcome external tutelage (donors agreeing to support country policies, instead of imposing policies as the price of aid) is not, as yet, widely appreciated. This could and should be a central message of incountry dissemination efforts.
Complementary reforms are essential, especially in the area of public sector governance
PRSPs are making a difference in limited but important ways, we suggest, and these effects will be magnified as more familiarisation occurs. But, to have the substantial positive results expected, PRSPs need to be credible -that is, to be capable of being implemented. The case studies suggest that this is going to be dependent on countries' making progress with longer-term, complementary reforms, especially in key fields of public sector governance, such as public expenditure accounting, budget reform and public service management.
The backlog of institutional reform
In most of the countries included in the study, institutional reforms covering these areas have been under way in principle for a number of years. But almost everywhere progress has been slow. In several countries, key initiatives are described as chronically stalled. This poses quite serious challenges to PRSP implementation, especially where basic conditions for predictability, transparency and accountability in public expenditure management are not yet (or no longer) in place.
To be sure, not all countries are in exactly the same situation. In countries where the basic conditions are favourable, Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) and other steps to make budgets more realistic and oriented towards outcome goals appear to be particularly important to the credibility of PRSPs. Where outcomeoriented, or programme-based, budgeting with a medium-term perspective has made headway, it is a short step to costing and prioritising PRSP goals. Otherwise, this can appear quite a daunting task.
The degree to which results-oriented reforms of public finance or civil service management were already in place and making headway was found, in the scoping stage of the study, to be a principal determinant of stakeholders' understanding of the purpose of the PRSP exercise. What might be involved in a national poverty reduction strategy was clear enough to officials who had already been involved in MTEF discussions, concerned with defining medium-term priorities on the basis of resource ceilings and outcome objectives. In such cases, the notion that resource ceilings should include the totality of public resources, including donor and government funds, and both capital and recurrent expenditures, was already accepted. This provided a fertile soil for acceptance of PRSP principles.
This was confirmed and reinforced by the larger body of evidence produced in the second phase of the study. Countries were found to be without exception investing substantial effort in their PRSPs; but understanding of what this was for was quite uneven, between as well as within countries. The degree to which it was being treated as a new departure, involving a substantial break with the more deplorable features of the aid relationship and its negative interaction with the national political economy, varied across countries. Moreover, attitudes seem to vary systematically with the progress that had been made with previous initiatives in public management and especially public finance management.
Without exception, the countries where PRSPs seemed to involve little more than a repackaging of existing poverty-focused projects and programmes were countries where public management reforms were stalled or otherwise in trouble. The importance of the broader reform record was, moreover, not limited to its effects on the perceptions and understanding of stakeholders. It also affected the degree to which the PRSP could be considered realistic, grounded in a clear sense of priorities and capable of being implemented.
Why budget reform matters
Unless some mechanism is in place for assessing overall resource constraints (including, crucially, the national resources that set limits on the successful absorption of foreign funds), unrealistic wish-lists are likely to take the place of priorities. Unless Ministries and local government authorities have started budgeting by objectives, they lack any mechanism or incentive to contribute to strategic policy-making. Unless the Ministry of Finance is capable of enforcing expenditure ceilings and limiting Ministries' ability to do their own deals with donors and lenders, PRSP priorities will not begin to be respected. So long as civil servants can get better and more interesting work by selling their skills to projects than by improving and implementing government policies, PRSPs will have no more value than previous unimplemented poverty policies.
The country studies are unanimous on this point. Very little will be achieved by PRSPs if they are not complemented by increased impetus to a range of reforms in public management. PRSPs might in fact be best presented as one part of a jigsaw puzzle, of which the centrepiece is the sort of exercise in medium-term financial planning associated with MTEFs. There are both negative and positive cases that support this view of the matter.
Negatively, the doubts expressed in the article on Benin about PRSP implementation prospects are strongly connected to worries about the slow implementation of programme budgeting and the failure of Bank-supported accountability reforms to touch the core problems of corruption and arbitrary power. In view of the nature of socio-political relations at the local level, decentralisation too emerges as a precondition for anything that would count as implementation of an antipoverty strategy. In Mali, also, the inability of the Ministry of Economy and Finance to impose budget discipline on the rest of government is a fundamental stumbling block. In theory, programme budgeting has been being implemented since 1998, but little progress has been made.
MTEFs and PRSPs
In both Ghana and Malawi the stalled implementation of MTEFs, after several years of effort, has been a substantial obstacle to making PRSPs effective in those countries. Not only does it hinder a link being established between the strategy and the budget and its execution, but the enforceability of a range of other governance reforms is also affected -because this is conditional upon the linkage of funding to institutional performance that the MTEF promises.
In the Ghana case, the MTEF was thrown into disarray by fiscal mismanagement and bad luck in 2000. But institutional difficulties also stood in the way of a close relationship between the PRSP and the MTEF, some of which remained even after the National Patriotic Party (NPP) government made a fresh start with the PRSP process in 2001. In Malawi, the PRSP and the MTEF are not institutionally disconnected, but fiscal discipline has been seriously undermined by political decisions, and the old lineitem approach to budgeting is said to have been reasserting itself, reversing the gains made in previous years.
Even in Tanzania, where the MTEF is not described as stalled, not enough has yet been done to give confidence that a virtuous circle of interactions between the PRSP and the central resource-allocation processes is being created. The fact that cash-limited budgets still have to be resorted to (so that the Treasury only disburses monies that it has in hand) means that sectoral MTEF ceilings do not lead to predictable disbursements. This reduces considerably the incentive effect on line Ministries (and now districts), and this is unquestionably a drag on the implementation of Tanzania's PRSP.
Many of the other countries in our sample are at an earlier stage in the implementation of public finance reforms. But, with that qualification in mind, they provide some positive lessons, underlining the usefulness of a close and synergistic relation between PRSPs and MTEFs and associated budget reforms. Kenya, until the sacking of key members of the Economic Recovery Team in April 2001, was a good example of MTEF-PRSP synergy, even though the wider field of accountability in government remained highly problematic. The potential for a joint evolution of MTEF reforms and efforts towards PRSP implementation also exists in Mozambique and Rwanda. But it is clear in both cases that much work remains to be done, and that capacity to do it is very limited.
Value-added from PRSPs
We have argued that PRSPs need MTEFs and other reforms of the same type. We have even suggested that MTEFs might be regarded as the centrepiece of a cluster of reforms on which both the likely character and the implementability of a PRSP depend. This naturally raises the question of how much the PRSP initiative contributes as such. If MTEFs and related governance reforms are what really matter, is there added value from having a PRSP as well? The question has particular point where, as found in several countries, the two exercises are led by the same over-stretched officials.
We are relatively sanguine about this. In the countries investigated, the PRSP does seem to have added value in at least two ways.
First, it has boosted the reform effort in general. In both Kenya (to April 2001) and Benin, it was thought that the joint impact of the MTEF and the PRSP was stronger than either would have been on its own, including the degree of encouragement provided to donors and IFIs to shift their aid instruments towards budget support. In both those cases and many others, such a change in aid modalities seems essential if poverty reduction is to be 'de-politicised', in the sense of becoming less tied up with particularistic patronage politics.
For Malawi, there seem to be doubts about whether the PRSP, or anything short of a political change at the top, will do much to revive the MTEF. There is also a suggestion of some backsliding on aid modalities, with HIPC2 funds going into special accounts after a period in which concessional funding was becoming more mainstreamed through the budget. Nevertheless, from both Malawi and Mali, there are indications that, even if the PRSP cannot do much for the national budget progress, it may have given impetus to some sector plans, thereby encouraging the development of common-basket funding of the sector-wide approach (SWAP) type.
In contrast with previous poverty-policy exercises in most countries, this stimulus may not be restricted to the social sectors, previously the main preserve of SWAPs. For Tanzania and Mozambique, it may extend to agriculture and cross-sectoral policy areas such as HIV/AIDS and environmental sustainability. At least the potential exists for imaginative new approaches in these areas, with governments leading fundamental rethinking rather than being content to allow policy to be driven by offers of project funding.
The second way in which the PRSP initiative adds value to the MTEF and related reforms is by opening new spaces for domestic policy dialogue on poverty. Given what we alluded to in the previous section about the way policy is made in case-study countries, an essential innovation of the PRSP is to open up public debate, thereby potentially creating new sources of public accountability, on poverty issues. A PRSP process may create policy spaces in which more voices can be heard and chronically neglected policy bottlenecks can be exposed to a wider national constituency. In other words, PRSP processes may add a missing political dimension to what, in many countries, has tended to be a rather technocratic reform environment. The extent to which this has actually happened is the subject of the next section.
These observations suggest that a priority is to increase the linkage and synchronisation between PRSPs and complementary reform measures, with PRSPs placed in the lead. The PRSP initiative provides a suitable opportunity to breathe new life into dormant reform programmes, and increase the pace of implementation where some successes are being achieved. Without suggesting that the changes that are needed are easy or capable of being completed quickly, there is no doubt that the PRSP initiative has raised the stakes. Our country evidence suggests that, without fresh impetus to key complementary reforms, the effort that has gone into the PRSPs may be largely dissipated. That would be a heavy price to pay.
Incentives for countries and donors
On this issue too, the argument among in-country stakeholders should not revolve around the need to please donors and access funds. On the contrary, it should be about how a substantial reduction in donor influence might be achieved in the medium term if countries play their cards right.
Achieving PRSPs that satisfy the basic conditions for credibility and implementability is the key to the transformations in aid relationships that most actors say they desire. The DAC donors have committed themselves to the principle of building, first and foremost, on partner-country development frameworks.
9 Action to reflect this commitment is to be expected and demanded. However, it is important to be realistic. The incentive for donors and IFIs to shift towards programmatic forms of support, and take more of a back seat, will be strong when countries reform their budgets and link their poverty reduction strategies to MTEFs. They will remain weak until this happens. Countries should surely regard this as a strong reason for quickening the pace of institutional reform.
New spaces for domestic policy dialogue have been created
Opening new spaces for domestic policy dialogue is one of the most important potential contributions of a PRSP process. Broadening commitment to poverty reduction efforts among national stakeholders is important as a source of both better policy ideas and stronger pressure to perform. The needed transformations in Africa's fragmented, patronage-oriented policy processes depend crucially on this element in the PRSP initiative. Rather than a technically more powerful approach to planning, the PRSP is a 9. OECD/DAC (2001), Executive Summary, para. 34.
way of ratcheting up the political costs and benefits associated with ignoring or doing something serious about poverty. It could lay the foundations of a new 'poverty contract', under which politicians and other leaders acquire new obligations and poor people gain new rights.
Gaining policy spaces
There were signs during the research in most of the study countries that the PRSP process was beginning to open up policy spaces in the hoped-for ways, creating a potential for greater changes in the future. New arenas were being created in which governments can be tackled by other national actors on what they are doing, or not doing, about poverty. The consultative processes organised by governments have been the subject of quite a lot of written comment, especially by NGOs, and several reports have focused closely on this aspect. 10 Together with the details reported in the country articles in this collection, these support a number of generalisations about experience in sub-Saharan Africa:
• Despite a rushed and unsatisfactory consultation process in most cases, the political profile of poverty issues in-country has been raised, and in some cases this may be a permanent effect.
• Where they are a significant force, NGOs and civil society organisations have mobilised to engage with national policy processes in a more strategic manner than before. In some cases, working relations between the government and development NGOs have improved.
• More substantial changes are to be expected as 'second-round' effects of the PRSP initiative, as more organisations appreciate the value of engaging with government at a policy level and set out to gain the capacities and resources to do so on an ongoing basis.
To summarise, there are grounds for being positive about the prospects for improved domestic policy dialogue (from an admittedly low base). On the other hand, some important qualifications do need to be added:
• In some cases, a rather narrow view of 'civil society' was taken, effectively excluding significant membership organisations such as trade unions and producer associations. There was also a general tendency to by-pass parliamentary institutions and procedures, and even, in some cases, key political processes within the executive arm of government. This was clearly unwise. Attempts to circumvent core political processes are not only contrary to a proper understanding of the PRSP principle of national ownership, but are very likely to backfire.
• New voices started being heard -not in most cases 'voices of the poor' in a direct sense, but at any rate organisations with a different perception from the government's on the needs and problems of poor people. A limitation was that these expressions of view tended to generate 'shopping lists' of desirable objectives. They did not contribute much to the more difficult tasks of defining priorities, and finding new ways of attaining goals that have defeated previous efforts. This limited the ability of the consultation mechanisms to influence policy.
• There are perceptions within countries, particularly among the more combative NGOs, that PRSPs have not fundamentally changed relations between recipient countries and the IFIs. Some changes for the better are noted (for example, IFIs making substantial efforts to stand back from PRSP preparation and make space for national consultations). However, PRSP design in most countries did not start with a blank sheet of paper. Some of the most important decisions have been 'pre-empted' by prior government-IFI agreements, for example on PRGF conditionalities and HIPC triggers. This is an inevitable limitation at this stage in the process. However, ways need to be found of mitigating its more negative consequences.
These three findings suggested two major priorities for action. First, donors should assist by providing broad-based, consistent, long-term support to participatory policymaking. Second, all PRSP partners need to be encouraged to work with greater transparency and openness, to increase trust and maximise synergies. Let us develop these proposals in turn.
Sustaining support and changing gear
On the first point, the country studies suggest that donors in general have been supportive of PRSP participation processes. Modes of delivery of this support include some exemplary experiences (involving pooled funding and arms-length delivery) and some that might have been better. Lack of co-ordination and excessive 'clientelism' are cited in some cases. Elsewhere, it is suggested that donors were rather short-term and instrumentalist in their support to the participatory processes of PRSP preparation.
How far these charges are accurate is of merely historical interest. The main point is to ensure that support is sustained, and does not go the way of other passing fashions among donors. In any case, now that PRSP formulation processes are all but completed, a change of gear is needed. This should involve a longer-term, more comprehensive and deliberately non-instrumental approach to strengthening participation in policy-making.
The following elements are likely to be helpful:
• Common-basket funding for policy work, under independent management of the trust-fund type, would help avoid situations in which NGOs and other 'donor-friendly' groups are strengthened at the expense of other parts of civil and political society (trade unions, professional associations, parliamentary groups). It would also reduce the danger of instrumentalisation arising from donor funding cycles.
• Formal political institutions matter for PRSPs, but they are not invariably well equipped to participate in policy debates on poverty. New forms of partnership for public policy debate are needed and should be supported; for example, parliamentary committees working with advocacy groups, and national research institutions developing policy ideas for political parties. Targeted assistance to the executive arm of government should not exclude equipping officials with facilitation skills for policy dialogue.
• The importance of politics to PRSPs should be reflected, furthermore, in the general attitudes of donor agencies and IFIs towards the PRSP experiment. Political developments are bound to imply uneven results between countries, and big setbacks from time to time. Politics brings risks and will test commitments. Temporary policy reversals are to be expected. All development partners need to set realistic expectations and timescales taking into account possible political scenarios, if only to avoid disillusionment.
• Governments and donors should encourage wider, deeper and more multilayered participation in PRSP processes, recognising 'civil society' as highly differentiated. The quality of the PRSP process and the quality of the policy thinking it generates depend on this. There is still a need to develop modalities of participation that yield a higher quality of debate on the more difficult issues, both technical and political. A more differentiated approach to participation in PRSPs is needed that would allow open forums, participatory appraisals, pressure groups, think tanks, research institutions and independent experts to contribute severally and in combination in the ways that suit them.
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• All phases of the PRSP need broad stakeholder engagement. Participation needs to start with design, but becomes more important as policy commitments begin to be implemented, annual reviews are scheduled and opportunities arise for disseminating and using monitoring information. Support to stakeholder involvement must not be allowed to lapse after the PRSP design stage. As argued in the next section, the monitoring phase is key, especially when strategy content is weak.
What openness implies
For some time to come, national ownership of PRSPs will be compromised, at least to some degree, by the fact that governments have already entered into HIPC, PRGF and concessional credit agreements with the IFIs, which are characterised by conditionalities of a traditional sort. This is largely inevitable, and not just for reasons of timing. Until PRSPs and PRSP performance-monitoring arrangements become substantial and credible, it is going to be difficult for the IFIs to abandon their conditionalitiesalthough streamlining them and merging review processes around the PRSP are certainly on the agenda, as discussed at the end of this article. The study suggests, however, that some of the current problems are not inevitable, and could be avoided. These are not caused by the fact that there are agreements reached separately between governments and the IFIs. They stem from the lack of openness and attention to public dissemination that sometimes still characterises their handling in-country.
Because the contents of agreements between governments and IFIs tend not to be made public, suspicions arise that they are actually 'secret'. In fact, all or large parts of most of the relevant agreements are published. But this does not do much to mitigate the problem, as little active dissemination is undertaken by either governments or IFIs. The latter tend to insist that this is government's responsibility and prerogative. This is formally correct but arguably an insufficient response in the PRSP context. This state of affairs undermines trust and the centrality of the PRSP in the policymaking process. There is also another cost, which is possibly as important. There are signs in some countries that national stakeholders mobilised in the PRSP process wish to hold governments to account on exactly the same issues as are covered in PRGF and other formal agreements. In other words, there is a potential for useful synergies between international pressures for reform and a strengthened domestic accountability. However, the hand of domestic pressure groups is weakened if the government's commitments to the IFIs are unknown, or in any way obscure.
The damage on both counts needs to be reduced, and synergies between external and domestic policy thinking and accountability maximised. This could happen if all participants were more active in explaining and disseminating the content of agreements. We suggest that this could be done without compromising the IMF's obligations and the legitimate place of confidentiality in the case of market-sensitive information, etc. All actors, including bilateral donors and advocacy organisations as well as government units and IFI resident missions, should be invited to play a part in an information policy aimed at building trust and strengthening the positive linkages between PRSPs and related agreements.
Monitoring processes may improve the quality of poverty reduction strategies
In many countries the content of PRSPs, as guiding policy documents, remains weak. Although the terms of the SPA study did not allow a systematic examination of policy content, all other evidence suggests that, for the case-study countries and others, a good start has been made, but no more than that. Improving the quality of PRSPs -their analytical sharpness, engagement with the lessons of past experience and sensitivity to political constraints and possibilities -is an important challenge. This is not just a technical matter. Undoubtedly, some issues of a fairly technical nature do deserve closer attention, not least the problem of costing a realistic PRS over the medium term.
12 However, what is most lacking is hard-hitting policy initiatives that arise from taking a fresh look at old problems and discovering new sources of political will to address them. These will come only if the process dimension of PRSPs also continues to develop, so that new mechanisms begin to emerge that are capable of tipping the political balance in favour of desirable changes.
Not business-as-usual
This is one reason why monitoring arrangements, especially the systems for feeding evidence back into policy, are so important. The other reason is that -as already emphasised -what donors are able to do will be strongly constrained by what happens in regard to PRSP monitoring. In both respects, the pace of substantive change will be influenced by the arrangements that emerge for tracking PRSP performance.
On which see PRSP Monitoring and Synthesis Project (2002).
It follows that it is a serious mistake to treat monitoring for PRSPs as a merely technical matter that can be handled as 'business-as-usual' by national statistical systems. PRSP monitoring needs to be tackled as a strategic task, not a technical one. The thinking about choice of indicators should respond to the particular and quite novel challenges of annual PRSP reviews. Thinking about institutional arrangements needs to be tailored to enabling the domestic policy dialogue to continue and deepen. These needs are unlikely to be met by merely ad hoc arrangements, such as tacking additional elements onto an existing poverty monitoring system. The country articles and other studies (for example, Booth and Lucas, 2002) suggest patchy progress on PRSP monitoring in most countries. One source of difficulty is that the above perspective on what PRSP monitoring is for is not widely accepted. Poverty monitoring is being taken more seriously again. But this tends to be taken in the traditional sense -monitoring poverty trends with household surveys. That is important, especially for long-term diagnostic purposes and to assist in targeting. But it is less urgent than developing credible measures to track improvements and identify snags over shorter time-scales of one, two or three years. It is only on this sort of time-scale that timely corrective action is possible. This implies systematic attention to intermediate outputs and outcomes.
Intermediate outcomes, some of which will be processes of institutional change rather than easily measured aspects of performance, clearly need greater attention. So does tracking of the delivery of financial and other inputs to poverty-reducing programmes and other mundane aspects of implementation monitoring. Moving to a more results-oriented approach should not mean that implementation can take care of itself.
Addressing these challenges will call for a new look, combining both realism and imagination, at routine reporting systems. There is, unfortunately, not much evidence of this happening. It will also require wider use of the powerful short-cut monitoring instruments that have been developed over the past decade, including tailor-made service delivery surveys and rapid participatory assessments. At present the plans being made for both surveys and participatory exercises are unduly skewed towards assessing final impacts.
How to put in place institutional mechanisms that generate a real demand for monitoring data is another challenge that needs more attention. The best long-term solution is to build on the information needs arising from budget reform/MTEF processes. In the shorter run, advocacy and research organisations can be supported to provide imaginative ways of feeding information and critical policy analysis back into the policy process. However, the key to this is deepening the engagement of a range of stakeholders in the PRSP process.
PRSPs invite a more substantial transformation of the aid relationship
The PRSP approach supports recipient countries in determining their own policies and assuming leadership of their own policy-making processes. This means confronting the tendency of much aid to undermine the conditions of its own effectiveness by weakening the capacities of government and other national institutions to work for themselves. It implies taking PRSPs as an opportunity to move the aid-reform agenda decisively forward.
Donor conduct matters
Country examples in our study support the idea that the way donors behave in-country can either support or frustrate national poverty reduction efforts. PRSPs are giving new significance to widely recognised difficulties with project-oriented approaches. Projects stand accused of cultivating patron-client relationships, encouraging a rent-seeking orientation in government and influencing domestic politics towards patron-client models that work against state effectiveness and accountability. Also, because they bypass government systems to a greater or lesser extent, projects contribute to skill shortages and weak incentives in government. The country evidence suggests that this sets up 'vicious' circles in which the form of aid delivery undermines national policymaking capacity and, in turn, helps to justify further by-passing of national institutions.
In contrast, PRSPs provide an opportunity to initiate a new type of 'virtuous' circle. In this scenario, the adoption of stronger national policies on poverty coincides with a shift by donors towards sector programmes or general budget support, and the wider adoption of common approaches and procedures by donors and concessional lenders. This accelerates poverty reduction measures that use, and thus help to improve and increase confidence in, government systems, leading to a gradual phasing out of by-pass solutions.
It is clear that the potential of the PRSP to contribute to this kind of advance in the aid relationship depends on the quality of the national policy process. But realising the potential also depends on donors' being proactive in promoting the chain of events that most of them wish to see. The study suggests three policy messages for donors, one about aid modalities, one about common procedures and one about the desirability of donors' 'benchmarking' their own performance as well as that of recipients.
New aid modalities: risks versus costs
The first contention is that, to realise this potential, donors must build more actively on the common ground that exists among them in regard to new aid modalities. Changes in aid modalities have a crucial role to play in enabling national policy-making to be driven by overarching poverty reduction/growth priorities rather than by offers of project funding. Without suggesting a uniform approach, we would argue that -in addition to pursuing the important but difficult aid harmonisation agenda -donors and IFIs need to make stronger moves to change their aid modalities towards those that use and can help to strengthen national systems. Not all national systems call for the same timetable of change, and not all donor organisations will be able to move at the same pace. However, quite a lot of shared commitment in principle exists. It is a question of finding effective ways of taking the agenda forward.
There are inevitably concerns within the donor/IFI community about when and how to make the shift to programme modalities, such as direct budget support. But currently different rules are being applied by different agencies in the same country settings, without any obvious basis for the difference. The World Bank's due-diligence tests are clearly set out, but they are somewhat more demanding than the rules applied by other agencies. Urgent work needs to be done between donors/IFIs and governments to spell out and agree the necessary conditions for moving away from project assistance and towards programme support.
It is not entirely clear at present whether on balance innovative modalities, such as general budget support, pose greater fiduciary and developmental risks. But if they do, this needs to be set against the large potential benefits from the virtuous circle scenario, and the heavy institutional and other costs of continuing with the old model of aid relations. The donor community as a whole needs to convince itself on this point.
The multiplication of review processes and frameworks
A similar sense of urgency needs to be adopted in respect of performance assessment and review processes. A more proactive approach is needed to accelerate the shift to common performance assessment and streamlined review processes. The core of the PRSP (and CDF) concept is to reduce the number of unco-ordinated demands made on recipient governments, by focusing on country-led criteria and processes. But there is little evidence to date that this has happened.
In fact, review processes seem to have multiplied with the introduction of PRSPs. Except under some SWAP arrangements and the few cases of pooled general budget support, donors and IFIs continue to work to different performance assessment frameworks, with different timelines and procedures. The study was unable to identify a single instance of review processes being merged, or performance assessment moving in behind the PRSP. This no doubt reflects the early stage reached in the PRSP processes, and the fact that most of the strategies have been slow to set up credible performance assessment arrangements. However, this too needs to be approached proactively, and without waiting for perfection to be achieved.
So, decisive steps need to be taken towards common performance assessment frameworks for donor assistance. Review processes need to be streamlined, within agencies, between agencies and between agencies and governments. Streamlining conditionality around the PRSP would be the basis for building stronger, longer-lasting partnerships in support of a nationally defined agenda. This certainly means reducing the number of separate review processes, by merging some and eliminating others (for example, absorbing Consultative Group meetings in PRSP annual reviews). Wherever reasonably possible, the form of merger should be to subordinate externally-led processes and criteria to those that enjoy the most country ownership, normally those of the PRSP.
Benchmarking donor performance
These changes will not happen without co-ordinated international effort, and a deliberate setting of targets for streamlining performance assessment based on current or attainable best practice across countries. Definite timetables should therefore be agreed for:
• taking the next step forward in countries where most has been achieved so far in bringing lending and budget support performance criteria into line with those indicated by the PRSP;
• extending current best practice to a further group of countries.
In other words, donors and IFIs should be benchmarking their own performance on implementing PRSP/CDF principles, and monitoring themselves and each other in this regard. Some immediate symbolic actions, such as cancelling a forthcoming Consultative Group in favour of a PRSP review, would have value in signalling a clear intention in this direction.
Conclusion
The body of this article has drawn together the more general findings and major conclusions from the study of PRSP experience, placing the accent on practical obstacles and possible ways of moving forward. In this final section, we return to the 'hypothesis' outlined in the Introduction that visualises changes in IFI policy leading, through greater national ownership, to more effectiveness in poverty reduction efforts. Clearly, this hypothesis may not be said to have been confirmed, or refuted. But can we say anything about its continuing plausibility in the light of the experience in our seven African countries?
Revisiting the PRSP hypothesis
In the Introduction, we pointed to the belief held by exponents of the PRSP approach that a 'policy process conditionality' in which recipient governments are expected to follow certain procedural steps, rather than accept specific policies, might succeed in generating commitment to poverty reduction where previous forms of conditional lending and aid have failed. The underlying hypothesis, derived from the literature on adjustment lending, says that national ownership of policies has been the crucial missing link. If process conditionality were to result in anti-poverty strategies that enjoyed more national ownership (while also being results-oriented, comprehensive and medium-term), then there would be a greater likelihood of their implementation. Such programmes would also be more sustainable, because they would enable a new type of partnership between donors and recipients, based on the leadership of the latter. This is not, in our view, a hypothesis that is ready for rigorous formulation and testing against systematic evidence. Quite a lot of preliminary work would be necessary to work up what is at most a preliminary working hypothesis into testable form, and assess what sort of evidence would be needed, over what time-scale, to give us firm conclusions. On the other hand, we can certainly ask several questions, First, has the new conditionality already produced policies that are more nationally owned than they otherwise would be? Second, on the basis of evidence so far, is the hypothesis still plausible? And does it need to be refined in any important respect?
Some of the country articles reach conclusions, on the basis of stakeholder interviews and the researchers' own observations, as to the degree to which different levels of ownership have been achieved. We summarise these and follow their implications presently. Almost all of this discussion refers to the level of national ownership of the PRSP process, which is at most the first step towards the national ownership of particular policies (privatising coffee marketing; providing universal primary health care, etc.). Reflections on process ownership may, nonetheless, be of some help in answering our other two questions, about plausibility and necessary refinements.
The meaning of 'ownership' is central here. If there are variables to do with the way policies are handled within countries that seem likely to affect effectiveness and sustainability, are they well captured by 'ownership'? Does the concept need to be broken down into constituent elements that have, or might turn out to have, quite different significance within the causal chains leading from international policies to effective poverty reduction processes? The latter does seem to be the case, as we now suggest.
Definitions of national ownership
This is not the place for a full review of the research literature on policy ownership. Instead we make use of an overview treatment of the subject, which has the virtue of having been applied in a major empirical study. Killick (1998: 86-8 ) contains a useful short discussion that draws together the well-known contribution of Johnson and Wasty (1993) with suggestions from Haggard and Kaufman (1992) and other sources. This concludes that four different issues are salient in assessing levels of national ownership:
• the locus of programme initiation (mainly external agency, or mainly recipient government?); • the intellectual conviction of key policy-makers or ministries (the technocratic dimension); • support of the top political leadership, as demonstrated by dramatic up-front actions (the political dimension); • broad support across and beyond government, for example, derived from a broad-based campaign to elicit support; • institutionalisation of the measures within the policy system ('stabilising expectations around a new set of incentives and convincing economic agents that they cannot easily be reversed'). Morrissey (2001: 6-8) has argued that the focus on ownership is misplaced, as well as being problematic from other points of view (it does not translate well into French or Portuguese, etc.). Attention should be concentrated, instead, on levels of commitment, this being understood to encompass both preferences and the political capacity to articulate these.
Morrissey's substantive argument is not inconsistent with the findings of our study. He is primarily concerned to dismiss the notion that intellectual origination of policiestheir selection and design by government -is a key issue. He maintains that this is both unrealistic and unnecessary: it does not fatally compromise the prospects of a policy's being effectively implemented that it has been taken 'off the shelf', for example, from a donor or international agency source.
We have no trouble going along with this. It implies, among other things, that the fact that the PRSP processes are an external initiative, from the point of view of all the study countries, is not a major problem for the assessment of ownership. However, this does not seem to provide a reason for jettisoning the concept of ownership, and replacing it with commitment. Instead, we can simply agree with Morrissey that the first of Killick's criteria may be less significant than has been thought, so that attention shifts to the next two levels, which are in fact about different sorts of commitment. Lastly, the substitution of the alternative concept of commitment would rule out the fourth criterion, institutionalisation. We have found that criterion to be rather important.
What the country experiences suggest
There are two initial questions that can be asked of the study findings: how do the countries' PRSPs shape up in terms of the different dimensions of ownership identified? And what may be said about the relative weights to be attached to the different dimensions?
Recalling that we are concerned with ownership of the PRSP process and not specific policies, ownership on the first dimension (initiation) is obviously low in all cases. Even though it may have drawn on wide international experience, the PRSP initiative came to each country from Washington. That, in itself, does not seem to have been seen as a problem. With the temporary exception of Mali in 2000, governments do not seem to have been reluctant or unable to acquire ownership ex post, taking the basic design 'off the shelf' in Morrissey's terms.
The findings suggest that ownership on the remaining dimensions is variable within and between countries. In other words, the PRSP initiative and the incentives put in place around it have not (yet) been sufficient to generate full national ownership, even in terms of the process. The country researchers also argue in several cases that having plenty of ownership in one or two of these dimensions and not in others is potentially damaging to the coherence and implementability of the plans. That is, effectiveness and sustainability are likely to be compromised.
In all cases, ownership is quite strong in the 'technocratic' dimension, but in most countries this has so far been rather narrowly shared. As we said at the beginning, even knowledge about the PRSP sometimes does not extend very far outside the central economic ministry. Nearly everywhere, local governments and regional authorities have been quite lightly involved and can scarcely be considered party to any 'intellectual conviction' that exists at the centre.
In one case (Mali), the study team considers that lack of commitment further down the administrative hierarchy, reflecting the poor level of general motivation in the civil service, is a greater worry than commitment at the top. In Mali, national ownership of plans in any thoroughgoing sense is not seen as a realistic objective, given the dominance of donors in the country. Nevertheless, even small steps towards mainstreaming poverty reduction efforts into national systems would be welcome.
The more general case is that the political dimension of ownership does not match technocratic commitment, and this is a potential source of real difficulty, because PRSP implementation will call for accelerated progress with other reforms to which the major obstacles are political. This conclusion emerges loud and clear from the articles on Benin, Kenya and Malawi. For Mozambique and Rwanda, it seems that there is quite strong political support, but this is narrowly based and certainly does not extend beyond the governing party. In Tanzania, high-level political support for the PRSP is not questioned, but willingness to actually implement it is.
As implied by our discussion in the fifth section, the achievements in terms of building a broad base of support across civil society are modest to date, but it may be too early to assess all the effects. This dimension is important because of the possibility that broadened interest in government policies on poverty could result in the government being held to account more than in the past. At least in Malawi, new structures have emerged that may fulfil this purpose to some degree, although the authors of the Malawi article insist that this will be no substitute for external financial pressure. The same may turn out to be the case in Kenya, with the same proviso.
Finally, the country studies lend support to the idea that the final dimensioninstitutionalisation -is critical. We take it that the arguments in the fourth section about the value of embedding the PRSP in the MTEF and the budget process, or vice versa, are relevant to this issue. The reports on Kenya, Mali and Rwanda argue particularly strongly that mainstreaming of poverty reduction, in the sense of articulating the goals of the strategy with the budget, and then using budgetary incentives to force line Ministries and districts to pay attention to them, is the most critical dimension of national ownership.
Necessary refinements
It seems to follow from this that at least one refinement of the hypothesis about ownership should be adopted before any more formal testing is contemplated. As far as strategy processes are concerned, all five of Killick's dimensions of ownership seem important, with the possible exception of the first (initiation). Political ownership at the top is the real challenge, and ownership as institutional mainstreaming is hardly less critical. The hypothesis about the sources of effectiveness and sustainability remains plausible, so long as these qualifications are noted.
What might refute the hypothesis at the end of the day is suggested by the conclusions of the Tanzania study. These say that even a PRSP benefiting from a moderately high degree of national ownership may not prove a very effective instrument for achieving poverty reduction objectives, because it may be too weak analytically or (what amounts to the same thing) backed by too little real implementation capacity.
That remains a serious possibility, one that goes outside the scope of the present study. To the extent that it emerges as a pattern, further questions will need to be asked -about what the sources of these deficiencies are (revisiting our themes in the second section); whether they reflect insufficiencies of the policy consultations (not so much their exclusiveness as their tendency to generate shopping lists, rather than critical reflection on past failures); and whether these are deficiencies that may be corrected, in time, as PRSP review and revision processes acquire more substance and become better embedded in national political economies.
